Court: Divisional Court (Lord Justice Ackner and Mr. Justice Webster)
Date: 12 November 1982
This case involved the interpretation of the term “public place” under section 1(4) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. That provision defines a public place to include “any highway and any other premises or place to which at the material time the public have or are permitted to have access, whether on payment or otherwise.”
The appellant, Knox, was found late at night in possession of a claw hammer on an upper landing of a block of council flats on the Langworthy Estate in Salford. He and another man were involved in a confrontation, and a police officer intervened. Knox was arrested and charged with possession of an offensive weapon in a public place contrary to section 1 of the 1953 Act.
The key issue raised before the magistrates was whether the landing of the flats where Knox was found constituted a “public place.” The facts found were that although the estate was owned by the local authority, there were no physical barriers, doors, or signs preventing members of the public from accessing the stairways or landings. The stairways were open to the atmosphere and allowed uninterrupted access throughout the complex. Non-residents had been observed using the estate as a thoroughfare to reach shops and amenities, and a nearby community centre was available to the general public. Although some signage purported to restrict access to tenants and their visitors, these were not official or enforceable traffic signs.
The defence argued that the area in question was not a public place because it served as an access route only to private residences and should be regarded as private, similar to front gardens of homes. They relied on Elkins v Cartlidge [1947] and Collinson (1931), suggesting that the public had no implied licence to enter the area, and access was limited to tenants and their visitors.
The prosecution countered that the estate, and particularly the landings, were accessible to the general public, either in fact or by tolerance, and thus met the statutory definition of a public place. They highlighted that the estate had hundreds of flats and housed over 1,500 people, and the physical structure permitted public movement throughout without restriction.
The magistrates found that there was no effective restriction on public access and considered the estate as a whole (excluding the individual flats themselves). They concluded that the landings fell within the meaning of a public place under the statute. Following this ruling, the appellant changed his plea to guilty and was fined £40 with £10 costs. He then appealed by case stated.
The Divisional Court upheld the magistrates’ decision. Webster J, delivering the judgment, held that the justices were entitled to consider the estate as a whole. Relying on the authority of Cawley v Frost [1976] 1 WLR 1207, the court reiterated that parts of a larger area need not be separately analysed if the entire area is broadly accessible to the public. The court rejected the defence's contention that the lack of an express licence negated public status, finding that factual access was sufficient under the first limb of the statutory test (“the public have access”).
The court further noted that in the absence of any doors, barriers, or exclusionary signs, and given the public’s historic use of the estate, including its landings, the area in question did not lose its status as a public place simply because it formed part of residential access routes.
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. The justices had not erred in law in finding that the landings were a public place under section 1(4) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953.